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Abstract
Rao and  lbanez develop an  evaluation method  that  majority of communities.  By the end of the construction
combines  qualitative  evidence  with quantitative  survey  process,  however,  80 percent of the community
data analyzed  with propensity  score methods on  matched  expressed  satisfaction with the  outcome.  An  analysis of
samples to study  the impact of a participatory  the determinants  of participation  shows that better
community-driven  social fund on  preference  targeting,  educated  and better networked  individuals  dominate  the
collective  action, and community  decisionmiakiig. The  process.  Propensity  score  analysis  reveals that the JSIF
data come from  a case stidy of five  pairs of comMunities  has had  a causal  impact on improvements  in trust and the
in Jamaica  where one  commnunity  in the pair has received  capacity  for  collective  action,  but  these gains are greater
funds from  the Jamaica  social  investimient  fund USIF)  for elites within  the communiity.  Both JSIF  and non-JSIF
while the other  has not-but has  been  picked to match  communities  are more  likely now to  make decisions that
the funded  community  in  its social  and  econlomilic  affect their lives which  indicates a broad-based  effort to
characteristics.  The qualitative  data reveal  that the social  promote  participatory  development  in the countrv, but
fund process  is elite-driven and  decisioninakinig  tends to  JSIF  communiities  do  not show  highier levels  of
be  dominated  by a small group of motivated  individuals.  community-driven  decisions  than non-JSIF  communities.
But by the  end of the  project there was  broad-based  The authors  slhed light  oni  the  complex ways  in which
satisfaction  with the  outcome.  The quantitative data  community-driven  development  works  inside
from  500  househiolds  mirror these  findings bv  showing  commilunities-a process that is deeply imbedded  within
that ex-ante the  social  fund  does not address  the  Jamaica's sociocultural  and  political context.
expressed  needs of the majority  of individuals  in the
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Washington, DC 20433.  Please contactPatricia Sader, rooml  MC3-556,telephone  202-473-3902,  fax 202-522-1153, email
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Development assistance  is becoming  increasingly  community-driven but there are still more
questions than clear answers  on how community driven development (CDD) really works.  Does it improve
participation and targeting?  What kind of impact does it have? Does it build the capacity for collective
action'?  One effective way on answering these important questions is by analyzing how the CDD process
works inside  communities, within their particular political, social and cultural systems.  Previous research on
CDD has tended to either use survey data from large samples or qualitative information from beneficiary
assessments of communities that received projects.  Both are limited in their ability to answer the questions
posed above.  Quantitative  analysis can establish broad patterns of the impact of an intervention on poverty
and well-being,  but is less useful in understanding the institutional context within which CDD operates.
Beneficiary assessments, on the other hand, can be very helpful in probing the social aspects  of CDD but are
subject to problems of selection bias, lack of generalizabilty,  and are limited in their ability to establish the
average causal  impact of a project.
This paper will attempt to provide some answers to these questions by integrating  quantitative and
qualitative methods to conduct an in-depth analysis of data from five pairs of randomly  selected
communities  in Jamaica. In each pair, one community has received assistance from the Jamaica Social
Investment Fund (JSIF) a community driven project assisted by the World Bank, while its very similar
matched counterpart has not received any assistance.  Qualitative  evidence from focus group discussions  and
in-depth interviews will draw out the institutional  and cultural context within which the Social  Fund process
operates.  It will sketch the various agents in the community, how leaders interacted with the community,
and how the community perceived its gains from the project.  Quantitative  data will then be analyzed to
evaluate the impact of social funds on measures of participation and collective  action capacity using
propensity score matching methods and regression analysis.  This mixed method approach  will permit a
nuanced and contextualized understanding of the social fund process in Jamaica, while providing some
evidence of the causal impact of the social fund on the social, political  and economic  life of individuals
within the community.  The in-depth data on social fund communities,  however,  is traded off with the size
and representativeness  of the sample  and our findings should not be read as an evaluation of the JSIF
portfolio of projects, but as an in-depth case study.
Social Investment Funds (SIFs) are perhaps the most visible mechanisms of CDD assistance,  and a
fast growing part of the World Bank's portfolio.  A Social Fund is both an organization and a process.
'The capacity for collective action is a widely used definition of social capital (Woolcock and Narayan,  2001).
However, social capital has so many other definitions  that, for the sake of clarity,  we will avoid using the term in this
paper.
3Typically, it is a government agency that is set up as semi-independent institution reporting directly to the
President or Prime Minister.  Its role is to disburse grants  directly to comrnunities in order to fund the
construction of a public good, with the communities contributing a small proportion of the costs (varying
from 5 to 20 per cent), in cash, labor or materials.  The key idea behind SEFs,  and other mechanisms  of
community driven development,  is that because communities participate  in choosing projects themselves,
the match between what a community needs and the project it receives  is much better than in a traditional
"top-down"  development project.  Several authors have also speculated that the process of applying and
obtaining funds, and constructing and managing a facility, will improve the community's capacity for
collective action (e.g.: Narayan and Ebbe  1997, Rao 2001).  The belief is that this will in turn result in
greater social cohesion,  improve the community's ability to manage its own future and set it on a sustainable
path towards poverty reduction
In recent months the literature on Community Driven Development,  and Social Funds more
specifically,  has seen a spurt of growth.  Conning and Kevane (2000)  review the theoretical and empirical
literature related to community based targeting (CBT), a specific type of CDD where the community assists
in targeting poor families in order to transfer cash or food.  They show that CBT possesses both positive and
negative characteristics - the benefits include utilizing local information and the consequent potential
improvement in targeting, but the risks are the increased opportunity of capture by elites within the
community and the possibility that local preferences may not be egalitarian.  Galasso and Ravallion (2001),
look at this within the context of a CBT program in Bangladesh.  They find that power within the
community matters in how the funds are disbursed, but that targeting within the village improves with
program size, lower inequality, proximity to the program office, among other things.  Khwaja (2001) moves
away from community based targeting to look at the community based provision of public goods in the
Agha Khan Rural Support Project in Northem Pakistan.  He finds that community participation in non-
technical decisions improves project maintenance,  but that when communities get involved in technical
decisions  it results in worse projects.  Repeating  a theme emphasized in several papers (e.g. Abraham and
Platteau 2001, Alesina  et. al.) he finds that more heterogeneous  communities are worse off, though better
leadership seems to have a positive  effect.
The literature  that focuses more specifically on Social Funds is both critical and favorable.  A
quantitative  impact evaluation (The Social Funds 2000 study) was recently  conducted by the World Bank's
Social Protection Unit using micro-data from several different countries  (Van Domelen,  2001).  Some
highlights of the findings are as follows:  An analysis of data based upon randomized trials in Bolivia found
that SIFs had a positive impact on educational infrastructure but did not improve educational outcomes.
However, health outcomes were improved with substantial declines in child mortality.  Water projects also
tended to improve access and quantity of water, but did not have an impact on water quality (Newman et. al.
42001).  Similarly an impact evaluation conducted  in Zambia (Chase and Sherbume-Benz,  2001)  found a
positive impact on education and health. An extensive impact evaluation study conducted in Nicaragua also
found a pro-poor bias with significant education and water-sanitation improvements  (World Bank, 2000).
Thus, the consensus  view from Social Funds 2000 is that Social Funds are generally pro-poor both on the
household level as well as geographically.  Social Funds 2000 also reports that they are generally welfare
improving.  However, these quantitative  studies do not have much to say on the impact of social funds on
participation and collective action.
Evidence on these questions, to date, comes largely from Beneficiary Assessments, which are
reports based usually upon Participatory Rural Appraisals  (PRA) and Participatory  Learning and Action
tools (PLA) (Chambers,  1997), usually commissioned by the headquarters  of a Social Fund, on targeted
communities.  They are not "impact evaluations" in the sense that they almost never include a control  group
or counter-factual  to calculate the causal impact of the intervention.  In a survey of Social Fund Beneficiary
Assessments Owen and Von Domelen (1998) report that they were "uniform in their finding that
beneficiaries  consistently felt that social fund projects reflected priority needs of the community, confirming
the essentially demand-driven nature of social funds."  Owen and Von Domelen also report that the
Beneficiary Assessments revealed a high degree of participation in the execution of projects.  The
Beneficiary  Assessment for Jamaica provides a more complex picture of the relationship of the Jamaican
Social Investment Fund (JSIF) to the communities it targets.  Its overall  findings, however,  also are that JSIF
has "succeeded to a large extent in its efforts to reduce poverty and increase social capital in targeted
communities."  Thus, the Bank's evaluations and assessments of Social Funds, on the whole, leave a
favorable  impression of an innovative process that not only is targeted to the poor, but is truly participatory
with the capacity to build a community's  capacity for collective action.  This has led to sharp increases in
lending to Social Fund and CDD projects, with a strong belief that CDD represents the future of
development  assistance.
Scholars outside the World Bank have tended to be more critical of SIFs and of the CDD process -
usually at the level of theory or by analyzing secondary data sources rather than examining survey data on
CDD projects.  Cornia (2001),  focussing on the role of Social Funds as mechanisms to offset the anti-poor
effects of structural adjustment programs, argues that they play only a minor role in assisting the
"adjustment poor" and the "chronic poor." Tendler (1999, 2000), reviewing evidence from beneficiary
assessment and project reports also argues that Social Funds tend to work better for communities that are
less poor, and that they are vulnerable to mismanagement and political manipulation.  She points out that the
SIF model functions under a set of assumptions that have not been empirical tested - viz. that they are more
responsive to consumer needs and preferences, and better tailored to local conditions.  Importantly,  she
claims that many SIFs are actually supply driven rather than demand driven because choices of communities
5are not actually made by them.  This claim is echoed by Abraham and Platteau (2001) who argue that CDD
processes substantially privilege local elites over the less advantaged  which leads to a "serious risk that
development efforts are hijacked by unaccountable  members of the elite." Abraham and Platteau focus on
the structures of power and information within communities, arguing that the socio-cultural, political  and
economic context of the community within which the CDD project is being implemented is extremely
important in determining its success or failure.
Community Driven Development and Social Investment Funds are, clearly, contentious  topics with
their advocates and detractors.  While the evidence seems to indicate that Social Funds reach the poor and
are relatively successful at improving service delivery,  the assumptions under which they operate  have still
not been put to test.  We do not know if SIFs are participatory: Do projects generated by SIEFs meet the
expressed preferences of the members of the community?  Does the involvement of the community improve
the community's capacity for collective  action?  Does the possibility of greater community involvement and
ownership result in more sustainable facilities?  These questions are best understood  within the political,
social and cultural life of communities within which CDD processes are deeply imbedded.
The Jamaican case-study analyzed  in this paper will attempt to provide some answers to these
questions,  while providing an example of the use of mixed-method techniques to conduct an ex-post impact
evaluation.  The paper is organized as follows:  In section 2 we will provide a brief history of Jamaica and
its involvement  in community led development,  this will be followed  in Section 3 with a an overview of the
qualitative  evidence from the five sets of communities.  The findings from the qualitative  evidence will then
be tested for their generalizability with survey data, Section 4 will outline the methods used to analyze the
survey data and the sampling methodology,  section 5 will present the quantitative results, and section 6 will
briefly review the qualitative and quantitative  evidence to provide an integrated perspective and conclude
the paper by summarizing  the policy implications of the evidence.  We should emphasize the paper should
not be viewed as an evaluation of the Jamaica  Social Investment Fund in its entirety.  As a case  study it
benefits from the ability to examine five projects in some depth, but it also suffers from having a limited
sample that lacks the scope to give a broad sense of JSIF's full portfolio of projects.
The Context:  History.  Political Culture and CDD in Jamaica
It is difficult to understand the role of community driven development  in Jamaica, and JSIF in
particular, without some sense of Jamaica's political history and culture.  Modem Jamaican history is
dominated by two cousins Norman Manley and Alexander Bustamante.  Manley  founded the People's
National Party (PNP) in 1938 in an organized effort to end British rule.  The PNP was closely associatedwith Bustamante's Industrial Trade Union (BITU).  Bustamante  broke away from the PNP in 1943 to form
the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) which,  along with the PNP, would come to dominate Jamaica in the post-
independence  years.  Before independence,  the two parties held power in various governments that were
granted successively more autonomy by the British. In 1962, Jamaica was finally granted its independence
and the JLP won the National Election which made Bustamante the first Prime Minister of independent
Jamaica.  Norman Manley became leader of the opposition.  From 1943 onward the JLP was increasingly
identified as belonging to the Center-Right, while the PNP was identified with the left.
In  1969 Norman Manley resigned as leader of the opposition and the leadership of the PNP passed
to his son Michael who became Jamaica's second Prime Minister in 1972 when the PNP won the general
election.  Under Michael Manley, Jamaican economic policy veered sharply to the left and his regime was
associated with high unemployment,  inflation and capital flight and increasing hostility towards the United
States.  The period also saw an increase in violent conflicts between the supporters  of the two parties, more
details about which are provided in the section on Arnett Gardens below.  In 1980, the JLP, now led by
Edward Seaga, won the national elections  and moved the country rightward with explicitly free market
oriented policies,  while building close relations with the US under Ronald Reagan and breaking off
diplomatic contact with Cuba.  The country's economy recovered to some extent, but Michael Manley -
who by then had eschewed  socialism - led the PNP back to power in 1989.  Manley resigned from the prime
ministership in  1992 handing over the position to Percival James Patterson who led the PNP to successive
electoral victories in  1993 and 1997 with moderate economic  policies.
The history of Community Driven Development in Jamaica is closely tied to Norman Manley and
the PNP.  The cooperative movement in Jamaica, which is the precursor to what is now called CDD, was
pioneered by the Jamaica Welfare Society which Manley founded in 1937 with funds from a settlement over
a labor dispute that he negotiated with multinational banana companies (Keith and Keith,  1992).  The annual
funds were to be used "not for charitable purposes.... but for real help in the cultural development of the
island and its peasants (p 7, Girvan,  1993).2"  The organization first focussed on building community centers
to serve as "catalysts for rural development (Girvan,  1993)."  By 1939 it had expanded its goals to foster
"cooperation and self-help activities among the rural poor."  The organization, over time, was considered
extremely successful and has been called one of "Norman Manley's truly lasting contributions"  (Keith and
Keith,  1992).  The Jamaican cooperative movement withered away in the 70's and 80's with the death of
some of its prime movers like Norman Manley and D.T.M. Girvan - whom Manley had appointed as the
head of the Jamaican Welfare Society in 1939.  This paralleled the worldwide trend away from the
cooperative  movement towards development  policies focussed more on top-down infrastructure and human
capital projects, and the liberalization of internal markets  and trade.  By the early 1990's, however, interest
7in CDD had revived in Latin America as an antidote to the structural  adjustment programs that characterized
the 1980's with several countries  establishing Social Funds.
In 1996, The Jamaican  Social Investment Fund (JSIF) was instituted by Patterson's PNP
government and is perceived in Jamaica as the successor to the Jamaica Welfare Society.  Its methods and
objectives closely parallel those of the Welfare Society,  and several (now quite elderly) participants  in
projects  instituted by the Welfare Society play a key role in JSIF projects at the community level.  JSIF
stated goal is in  "improving living standards  for the poor and vulnerable."  It has four key objectives  -
-To establish an efficient, demand, driven and complementary  mechanism to deliver basic services
to the poor.
-To mobilize and channel additional  resources to the areas of social assistance and basic social and
economic  infrastructure.
- To increase the institutional capacity of governmental  and non-governmental  entities to design,
implement  and manage small scale community based projects
- To empower communities  by seeking to ensure greater levels of community involvement  in
development programs and community participation in decisions affecting their lives.
As one of the Social Funds in the Latin America and Caribbean region it has been clearly influenced
in its methods and practices by experiences  with Social Funds in countries such as Nicaragua, Ecuador and
Zambia.  JSIF should, however, also be seen within the context of Jamaica's history with the cooperative
movement.  The writings of D.T.M.  Girvan, who led the Jamaica Welfare Society during most of its active
years, and then advised the cooperative  movement in Ecuador and Chile, provide an instructive window into
the historical context of the CDD processes.  One of the key foundations of his view was to "work together
in groups to do those things which we as individuals cannot do."  An excerpt from a paper he wrote in 1941
(Girvan  1993) on "The Better Community Approach to Community  Development,"  shows how deeply
embedded contemporary social fund practice  is within the cooperative movement:
Building a Better Community depends first andforemost on the desire  for citizens  for self-
improvement.  This desire may be found in most communities in varying degrees; in all it can be aroused
and stimulated.
Care  must, however, be taken before arousing  this desire in any community to secure the
cooperation of local "key" people and to gather basic information about the community.  Key people would
be individuals  such as teachers  and other  public officers, ministers and clergy, and the voluntary leaders of
existing community organizations  as well as, perhaps, some of the citizens who wish to help or  who possess
influence that can be of service.
2Clearly "cultural"  here was meant to include social and economic development.
8If a temporary Community Committee can be immediatelyformedfrom among these leaders, this
would be an excellent start, as the objective is to have all community activities planned  and coordinated  by a
Community Council comprised of representatives  from existing community groups with co-opted members
from amongst the citizens.
In any case, with the help of local leaders, a Social Survey should be undertaken which will provide
salient  facts about social and economic conditions, and existing community structures. Based on this,
decisions will be taken about what can be done to encourage and to extend existing community
organisations, and  to help in arranging  trainingfor  their  leaders and  in planning  their  programme along
concrete lines, including  the formation ofpractical  projects.
These sixty year old guidelines seem to have had a clear influence in the manner in which the
Jamaican  Social Investment  Fund (JSIF) currently operates.  JSIF is an autonomous  govemment agency that
reports directly to the Ministry of Finance. It solicits proposals from communities by widely disseminating
information via radio and television.  NGOs, community based organizations (CBOs), and central
govemment agencies facilitate the applications by helping key actors organize the community to decide on
and apply for a project.  These NGO, CBOs and key actors within conmmunities often have a past association
with the Jamaica Welfare Society and follow similar procedures.  The proposal  usually includes a social
appraisal outlining the problems faced by the community, how this intersects with social and economic
constraints within the community, and the role that a sub-project can play in improving living standards.
JSIF screens the applications on the basis of its target criteria which mandate a focus on the poorest
communities,  and then undertakes a series of field visits to identify through research (e.g: PPAs, animation,
sample surveys) a realistic sense of the needs of the community.
Like other Social Funds, communities are usually required  to make a contribution to construction
costs either in cash or in kind.  Projects are supposed to be decided in broad consultation with the
community and must fall within a menu of projects that JSIF will support.  There are however, notable
exceptions to this menu-based restriction as we will demonstrate below.  The projects are generally executed
by contractors  employed by JSIF, and then managed by the appropriate  ministry (e.g. Education, Health).  It
is expected  that the conmnunity, having a greater sense of ownership of the project, will participate in its
maintenance  and management thus improving project sustainability.
Having seen a bit of the history and background of CDD in Jamaica and looked at JSIF's guidelines,
let us now turn to an examination of how these guidelines work in practice.
2. Oualitative Analysis 3
3 The names of three of the five communities have been changed.  Two communities, Port Royal and Arnett Gardens,
are extremely well known and difficult to disguise. Furthermore, understanding  the impact of JSIF project in themThe qualitative data is based upon semi-structured  in-depth interviews  with several key players  in
each community:  JSIF project coordinators, community leaders  (elected officials,  community elders,
pastors, etc.), and members of the JSIF committee in each community who helped organize and manage the
project.  Three extended focus group discussions were also conducted in each community with groups of
people who were, as far as possible, selected to represent  the entire community.  Data from these interviews
is supplemented with observations from field visits by Ruel Cooke, one of the consultants who supervised
the data collection,  and Rao who conducted  field visits in six of the ten communities  in the sample.  The
report on Amett Gardens  is also supplemented by a report by Duncan (2001)  commissioned for this paper,
based upon several additional interviews with "Dons,"  politicians, and other men and women who live in the
community.
We should note that the focus groups, in-depth interviews were not conducted on a random sample.
Moreover,  despite efforts to avoid the problem, it is possible that members of the community who
participated in the focus  group discussions were more likely to have participated actively in the social fund
process.  This could, potentially, result in biased findings.  Therefore,  the qualitative findings should not be
examined on their own, but in conjunction with the survey results that are based upon a representative
random sample.  The qualitative information  is useful, however, to sketch a narrative of participation  and
collective action in the JSIF and non-JSEF communities.  We will outline the key players,  the manner in
which community mobilization occurred,  and the perceived impact of the project the in community.  The
non-JSIF community will also be very briefly sketched to provide a sense of the difference  between the
matched pairs.
Community Pair A:
Port Royal and Rennock Lodge
Port Royal is an old and historic town that was the capital of Jamaica when it was under Spanish
rule.  It subsequently became a haven for pirates and buccaneers.  Most of the old Spanish town was
submerged after a series of hurricanes  and earthquakes in the  1  9gh century.  The town also has a large fort
dating from the 18h century and has significant but underdeveloped potential as a tourist site.  It is also a
community that has over the years, through generations  of inter-marriage,  become extremely tight knit, but
requires  an understanding of their history. For these reasons  we have retained their real names.  The names of all the
individuals quoted have also been changed with the exception of prominent  people who would be difficult to disguise.
10with clear divisions based upon class, status, religion, and political affiliation.  The community is dominated
by the Port Royal Brotherhood,  a semi-governmental  authority,  which owns most of the public infrastructure
and housing, and is considered akin to a local planning authority.  Interestingly,  the Port Royal Brotherhood
was founded by D.T.M Girvan in 1952 as an arm of the Jamaican Welfare Society, but its foundations in the
cooperative movement seem to have evolved into a more political function.
There is a clear split in the community between those loyal to the Brotherhood and those opposed to
it.  In the last few years an arm of the local citizens association,  functioning as an alternative to the
Brotherhood,  formed a development group known as the Port Royal Environmental  Management Trust
(PREMT) that has been spearheading an effort to bring in more developmental  investment into the town.  In
particular they plan to develop the town as a port for cruise ships like the large tourist ports of Montego Bay
and Ocho Rios.  This has the potential to transform the town into an important tourist site.
PREMT were also responsible for initiating the JSIF proposal.  They hired a consultancy firm called
EduTech to develop the proposal and submit it to JSIF.  The proposal, which was developed with limited
community consultation, asked to have a computer center in the local school.  The idea was that this center
would benefit students during school hours but would also be used to instruct adults.  PREMT works
independently  of, and perhaps even in opposition  to the Brotherhood.  In the words of a PREMT leader, "Us
and them (the Brotherhood) don't get along."  This indicates that the social  fund application process may be
at the center of the internal politics of the community.  Contrary to the predictions of theories of
participation,  the divisions within the community are not a result of its heterogeneity  - but a consequence  of
how tightly bound it is.  Everyone seems to be everyone elses kin and, over the years, personal animosities
and family conflicts appear to have spilled over into the community's internal decision making process.  It is
possible that PREMT's efforts at eliciting JSIF funds is an attempt to rival the Brotherhood's historical
association with the Jamaican Welfare Society.
The Port Royal project provided a computer center for the school.  The project was not participatory
in the sense that a computer center was not a priority with most the members of the community who would
have preferred a project that generated more employment.  As described above, PREMT seems to have
made the decision almost unilaterally,  and the technical orientation of the project seems to have been
influenced by the consultants (EDUTECH)  chosen to help with writing the JSIF proposal.  PREMT sees the
center as part of an overall development plan for Port Royal and envisages a day when computer-  trained
members of the community will be able to get jobs at the resorts and other offices that they believe will
come with the tourist influx.  In this sense PREMT is acting as a local social planner - and the notion that
community input and participation led to the choice of project is clearly not true in this case.  Also, it is
clear that the "traditional leadership"  i.e.: The Brotherhood,  was bypassed in the JSIF application.  While
this goes against JSIF guidelines, it seemed inevitable that in a community with deep divisions it would bevery difficult for all factions to come to a common agreement on a project.  Respondents  in Port Royal,
however, claim that other projects in the community - notably one conducted by "New Horizons,"  were
much more participatory.  In JSIF's favor they also say that JSIF, while less participatory, was also more
transparent in keeping all transactions above board and communicating information  about the project clearly
to the community.
Note that despite the lack of widespread participation in the choice of project, there seems to be a lot
of pride and support for the computer center within the community.  Respondents  said that this was the first
concrete example of the much-vaunted changes that had been promised for many years by PREMT.  There
was also a general perception that school children were benefiting from the center, and in a visit that we
made it was clear that there was excess demand for the use of the computers with children intently working
and trying to maximize their time on them.  The success of the project has caused  some resentment among
the adults in the community who believe that they too should be allowed to use the computers under an adult
education program.  Adults claimed that when the project was first proposed, they were told that adults
would also be able to benefit from it.  The fact that this has not happened has caused some resentment.
The project did seem to have a clear but limited impact on the community's  ability to work together
for common goals.  This is a deeply fragmented community, but respondents said that they "managed to
work together" even though "disputes are too deep."  In visiting the community it was clear that those
members  who were not followers of the Brotherhood were more likely to express enthusiasm  about the
project and to express interest in mobilizing more projects in the community.  One of the bases for the
division was an inherent difference of opinion on whether the community should open up and widely
embrace the tourist trade or whether it should attempt to resist the disruptive  changes in social and
community life that this would cause.  The computer center had widespread support partly because it
represented a positive, modem, change in a manner that did not lead to outside encroachment and thus had
support from both groups.
It is difficult to find a community that is a close match with Port Royal,  but Rennock Lodge comes
reasonably close in that it is also is located on the sea and is an old community with many long term
residents.  However, Port Royal's unique history makes it different from every other community  in Jamaica
including Rennock Lodge.  Rennock Lodge is also more "urban" than Port Royal in the sense that it is much
closer to the capital  city - Kingston and has some of the attendant social problems with gangs and youth
unemployment.
Rennock Lodge is also different  in that there seem to be no organizations  or institutions providing
leadership within it and no group appears to be making efforts to mobilize resources on behalf of the
community.  The leadership that exists does not seem to have wide support - respondents described resource
allocation within the community as being characterized  by the "paternalistic distribution of political
12patronage."  Most community activities center around the football  (soccer) club and the local Anglican
Church.  Like Port Royal,  the community is socially and politically homogenous but it does not exhibit Port
Royal's deep kin-based divisions.
To summarize,  it is clear that the JSIF project brought a sense of common purpose to the Port Royal
- many members of the community were able to see a concrete  example of progress that was a signal of
changes to come, though some were apprehensive of the impact those changes.  There is also a feeling,
however, that the benefits of the project have not been equitably distributed.  Moreover, the sense of




The second community we examine is Virginia, where JSIF funded the construction of a basic
school (pre-school  from ages 3-6).  Virginia is a rural community where most residents are either small
farmers or workers  in the local sugar cane fields and coffee plantations.  Community  life is centered  around
the local Anglican  Church, where one of the church elders Mr. Larry Jordan was the central player  in
mobilizing the community towards accessing development projects.  Mr. Jordan is a deeply religious man
who, many years ago, was associated with the Jamaica Welfare Society.
Mr. Jordan is also the pivotal figure behind Virginia's JSIF assisted basic school project.  Virginia
had a school whose structure was severely damaged by Hurricane Gilbert in 1988.  When Mr. Jordan came
to hear about JSIF nine years later, he used the church and its leadership to mobilize the community to apply
for funds to renovate the school.  The community seems to have readily agreed to this, since the lack of a
good school structure was obviously a pressing need.  The fact that a good structure once existed, but had
been damaged without any real repairs for several years was a motivating factor.  The project seems to have
been thoroughly cooperative and participatory - the community provided labor services and were given
training to help with construction skills and management.
Teenagers and men and women in their 20's do, however, seem disengaged  from these processes.
They express resentment against the church and its central role in community life.  Some wish to have a
"youth center" that they would like to mobilize JSIF funds towards.  Some of the resentment against the JSIF
school project is a level of unhappiness  that JSIF changed the management of the school, replacing an old,
revered school principal with a new person who most in the community do not seem to like.  This suggested
that the greater sense of ownership that participation engineers  may also lead to a greater  desire to control
13the project after it is created with a greater say over its management.  It is unclear that the same level of
resentment would have been expressed  with an old style development project.
Virginia has been matched with Downing - a community that is about a twenty minute  drive away
from Virginia - similar in its demographic  characteristics  and its church-centered  social life.  Downing has
its own history with JSIF.  It also has a school, which is in reasonably good shape, but suffers from constant
vandalism by "disaffected youth."  Teenagers tend to congregate in its grounds, play loud music, games,
harass students and teachers, and throw rocks at windows.  The teachers  also expressed a fear of crime and
violence because of this, but we were not able to detect any actual incidents of crime or violence around the
premises of the school.  Because of the vandalism, residents of Downing had applied to JSIEF for some funds
to build a gated fence around the school.  JSIF rejected  the proposal for reasons that are unclear.
In summary, JSEF  seems to have had a largely positive impact in Virginia.  There was a clearly a
pressing need to renovate the basic school and the community was easily mobilized towards  this end by a
respected elder with experience  in community-based  development.  The JSIF project seems to have created
hope in the community for further projects and motivated them to seek further assistance.
Community Pair C
New Valley/Orange  - Shadow/Califomia
JS1F  funded a road that connected the communities of New Valley and Orange to a highway.  Once
again this project demonstrates the importance of the church in rural Jamaica, and its important role in
community driven development.  The project was initiated by the pastor Rev. Williams of New Valley who
read about JSIF in the newspaper and mobilized church and community leaders to hamess community
support to apply for funds.  Both communities, New Valley and Orange were involved in writing the
application,  and the project has benefited both communities  - though arguably it has benefited New Valley
more than Orange.
The "pastor was the leader"  here.  It was initially difficult to mobilize the community but Rev.
Williams  worked hard to get the process moving.  Ultimately "no (monetary)  contribution  was required in
the project so everyone  participated"  and voluntarily provided services like free labor and food.  Despite the
projects obvious benefits, residents of New Valley expressed some dissatisfaction  with JSIF saying that the
contractors did "shoddy work"  and that employment on the project was not fairly distributed.  On the choice
of contractor they said, "because we are beggars we have to accept what JSIF gives us."  The community
was often consulted with several  meetings held during the initial stages.  This generated complaints of "too
many meetings."  But there was no consultation about the choice of contractor.  Some resentment was also
directed at Rev. Williams who, according to a focus group, "was thinking of his own convenience"  by
14making sure that the road was extended till it "ended at the church."  Once again we hear reports that youth
are disaffected, and do not participate in community activities.
However, the project has had a "tremendously positive" impact on the life of the community.  The
road is a "lifeline" that allows residents to take their produce to the market, access taxis and other
transportation  to connect to the main arteries.  It seems  obvious that the road has had a transforning effect
on the community's  economic and social life.  Residents told us that participating  in the project developed a
sense of "ecumenism"  in the community.  It has energized various local community associations that were
lying dormant for several years.  The community is enthused enough that they want to apply for more funds
to extent the road even further. They also wish to look for funds for a school or a clinic.
Shadow/Califomia  is the matching pair of communities for New Valley/Orange.  It is located in the
same county as New Valley/Orange  and has similar problems in that it suffers from the lack of a road, which
cuts it off from the main Jamaican highways.  This leads to several problems - high prices for water, lack of
access to schools, and difficulty transporting cash crops.  The community seems to have a sense that it is
overlooked by its political representatives,  a focus group discussion described themselves  as a "rejected
community."
Yet, the community, also deeply religious and centered around the church, has a high degree of
social cohesion and is eager to participate  in collective  action for the common good.  A focus group
discussion on their work towards maintaining the unpaved road that now exists reveals this succinctly, "We
work together for the good maintenance  of the road because all of us need it.  We filled it with cement and
other materials.  We worked on it by ourselves."  "We had a benefit from the experience.  We leamed to
work together."  In fact, we recently received reports that the community had organized itself into protesting
the lack of funds for a road by blocking one of Jamaica's main highways to bring attention to their plight.
While not everyone would see this is as a constructive activity, it does indeed demonstrate  a great deal of
collective action capacity.
The data from these two sets of communities reveals that the social fund has clearly had a positive
impact on New Valley/Orange  by providing  a desperately needed resource.  While there was some
resentment expressed against the project, this experience  with collective action seems to have left the
community thirsting for more.
Community Pair D
Arnett Gardens - Union Gardens4
4The Arnett Gardens report is based upon fieldwork conducted by Ruel Cooke for the JSIF evaluation,  and a separate
study by Grace  Imani Duncan (2001)  commissioned for this paper followed up by work by Duncan and Woolcock
(2002).
15Arnett Gardens and Union Gardens are located in inner-city Kingston, Jamaica's capital city and
also its largest with almost half the country's population.  Arnett Gardens where the JSIF project is located is
known as a "garrison community."  These  are communities in Kingston that were founded  and controlled by
the PNP and the JLP.  Arnett is a stronghold of the PNP.  In order to understand the role of the JSIF project
in these communities,  it will help to briefly recount the history of violence and political conflict in inner-city
Kingston.
Towards the end of the 1960's the first garrison community, Tivoli Gardens, was established by the
JLP as part of what was called a "slum clearance project."  Arnett Gardens was established in 1972-74 by
the PNP to counter the influence  of Tivoli Gardens.  Partly as a result of political mobilization within Tivoli
and Arnett Gardens, the  1970's saw a sharp increase in politically driven violence which prompted the then
PNP Prime Minister Michael Manley to declare a State of Emergency in 1976.  In 1978 Bob Marley, the
reggae icon, attempted to bring the political parties together  with the One Love Peace Concert, where
Edward Seaga - the JLP leader and Manley - went on-stage with Marley and held hands together to
symbolically mark a new era.
The One Love concert represents an important marker in Jamaican history, but was not associated
with a reduction in political violence which peaked in the early  1980's.  As the 80's progressed, however,
the garrison communities became central  locations for the drug trade primarily as a conduit for transporting
marijuana and cocaine to the United States.  Thus, the drug economy supplanted politics as the driving force
behind violence and rival gangs, organized around the same boundaries  as the garrisons, competed over the
trade.  By 1996-97,  violence  had reached the highest point in Jamaican  history with homicides showing a 33
per cent increase between  1995 and 1997.
In 1996 a proposal was floated to reconstruct the Kingston Public Hospital, which is located close to
the garrison communities and services people from inner-city Kingston.  To facilitate the construction of the
hospital, two of the most powerful Dons in Jamaica, Dudus (JLP) and Zekes (PNP) orchestrated a peace
agreement  in 1996.  The agreement is better characterized  as a strategic alliance carefully demarcating areas
of control.  Preliminary fieldwork  seems to suggests that Zekes was allowed to control the areas bordering
greater Kingston and thus access to jobs and other economic opportunities,  while Dudus was granted control
over the wharfs and therefore to the drug and gun trade (Duncan, 2001).  The JSIF sponsored renovation of
the Tony Spaulding Stadium in Arnett Gardens should be viewed within this context.
The JSIF effort began in  1996 when JSIF commissioned  a study by a team of anthropologists to
understand how public assistance could help alleviate  the violence (Moser and Holland,  1997).  On the basis
of several  in-depth interviews, PRA exercises and focus  groups discussions,  the anthropologists  attempted to
identify the complex socio-cultural, political and economic bases for the violence.  Underlying all these
16factors, they said were two key causes  -- the lack of  jobs and the lack of cooperation and communication
across communities.  They, therefore suggested,  as a priority, that JSIF assist in "rehabilitating and
equipping integrated community spaces such as sports facilities,  teen centers and training facilities,"
claiming that this would provide "a modest entry point to break contextually specific cycles of poverty and
violence.."  Given that JSIF typically sponsors projects related to schools, health clinics, roads, and water,
constructing a sports facility was a radical departure from practice.  Taking account of Moser and Holland's
recommendations,  Vision Development - a local NGO - applied to JSIF for funds to assist the rehabilitation
of the Tony Spaulding Stadium which was an existing facility that was used primarily as a football field for
the area teams.  JSIF funded in the construction of bleachers,  and in renovating  locker rooms and training
facilities. The goal was to make the Complex a center of inter-community sports activity.
There is little evidence that this was done in a participatory manner.  Unlike Virginia or New Valley
there was almost no direct community participation,  aside from the social analysis, or community
contribution  and almost all the costs, planning and construction  was bome by JSIF.  There was a clear lack
of information about the JSIF process in Arnett Gardens, and in fact almost no one we spoke was aware that
the project was sponsored by JSIF.  We were told that there was a lot of support for the project, about which
the "community  got together as a family," but, "nobody from the community worked on the project."  There
was some resentment expressed about this - a belief that the work was done by workers from outside when it
was an obvious source of employment in a community that desperately needed jobs.  All of this is clear
evidence that JSIF had essentially given up following its participation guidelines here.  This does not mean
that JSIF made the wrong decision.  Given the nature of the project and what it was trying to accomplish,
one can imagine that it would have been particularly  difficult to get the community to make contributions.
When this field work was conducted in March 2000, the sense we got was that the project had
accomplished wonders.  A focus group said, "the complex is a showpiece and offers a fantastic view of the
community.  It is a sign of progress as it adds to the overall  development of the community and removes
some of the stigma attached to it."  Rao spent a day going from house to house asking questions about
people's perceptions about the project and without exception,  and without prompting, he was told that there
was a huge drop in violence that residents directly attributed to the new stadium.  "The kids play football
instead of killing each other."  "If there are more sporting activities the youths will have less time to think
about guns."  While Arnett Gardens, in March 2000, was still not a neighborhood where residents of
Kingston would feel safe to roam around in, it no longer seemed like the war zone it used to be. Elderly men
and women sat on their porches or gardens, children played cricket or soccer on the street.  Contrast this
with another nearby area - a few miles away - when one felt a clear sense of danger.  Young men were
roaming the streets with unsheathed knives stuck in their belts, guns were carried freely.  Outsiders were
stared at and were treated with suspicion.
17Figure  1 which presents time series data on crime from Western Kingston,  where the oldest and best
established garrison communities  are located, provides dramatic evidence  of the decline in crime and
violence.  All types of crime have shown a decline here since  1996.  This was prior to the JSIF intervention.
Note however, that after  1997 crime violence declined at a steeper rate suggesting that JSIF may have
provided some additional impetus to the process.  Figure 2 provides evidence to show that the decline in
violence in Western Jamaica is in sharp contrast to the rest of Jamaica where murder rates have remained
relatively stable.  Nevertheless it is important to not attribute all the declines  in violence to the Tony
Spaulding renovation but to see it as part of a concerted effort to reduce violence in the garrison
communities.
Arnett Gardens remains one of the poorest neighborhoods in Kingston.  A focus group discussion
revealed, for instance that,  "We are saddened by the fact that the community is mostly brought together by
death, along with dances and sporting activities."  Teenage pregnancy, unemployment,  and the youth
discontentment remain serious problems.  It is still difficult to get the community to work together  for the
common good and political parties continue to define the neighborhoods.  A community leader told us,  "We
need a community system, not a party system."  "Leadership  is dispersed between  ...(various  leaders).
Some take care of security, and others take care of neighborhood needs."
Much of our findings from March 2000 need to be rethought  in the wake of the events of July 2001,
when intense violence  flared up again in the garrison communities.  While the annual  murder rate is still not
in, it is likely to soar again to the levels of the 90's indicating that the abatement in violence was more a lull
than a cessation.  As Jamaica drew closer to a general election in 2002, it appeared that traditional politically
driven tensions  were once again causing conflict.  Therefore,  the possible impact that the Tony Spaulding
stadium project had on the community does not seem to have been sustained over the long term.
Furthermore,  to the extent that the peace process caused a lull in the violence, it does not seem to have been
a direct result of the stadium renovation as much as part of a broad peace initiative instituted between the
two main warring factions in Kingston.  Yet, there is also no question that the stadium has had a large and
positive impact on the community in the sense that it is a symbol or pride and provides a valuable public
service.
The matching community - Union Gardens is similar to Arnett gardens in its occupational  structure
and levels of poverty.  Patterns of violence in Union Gardens mirror those in Arnett gardens indicating the
lack of a causal link between the Tony Spaulding stadium initiative and the cessation of violence in the two
communities.  However, we were told in 2000 that Union Gardens is "as united as can be expected."  They
have a citizens association where most community-wide decisions are made.  A leader told us that they "are
the only community in the western belt (of  Kingston)  not warring against a neighboring  one."  He also told
18us that "Union Gardens in rejected by all."  Thus, there is a clear sense that they have been abandoned -
perhaps amplified by the high profile interventions they see in places like Arnett Gardens.
To summarize, the Tony Spaulding  stadium has had an impact on Arnett Gardens that is both
symbolic and real.  It represents  an intervention that was preceded by some thought and analysis by JSEF,
and participatory aspects  seem to have been given up in favor of the more larger goal of doing something
that would dramatically reduce violence.  As a part of the peace initiatives instituted at the time of its
conclusion,  it seems to have played a part in the reduction in violence between  1999 and 2001 but its impact
must be seen in the context of the extraordinary peace agreement arrived at between the two Dons, Zekes
and Dudus,  in 1996.  However, the recent increase in politically driven violence in these communities
suggests that peace was not sustainable  over the long term.  Long term peace would require a basic change
in Jamaica's political culture which is, perhaps, an elusive goal (Keith and Keith,  1992).
Community Pair E:
Rock Creek/Creighton
Rock Creek is located at the west end of Jamaica, close to the resort town of Negril  and many of its
residents commute to Negril to work in the tourist industry.  Rock Creek had a basic school that was housed
in a church building with a roof that was damaged by a hurricane.  In  1997, even this dilapidated  structure
was destroyed by a fire.  The fire motivated the community to seek JSEF funds to renovate the school
building.  The school principal instigated efforts to start the renovation under the auspices of the Sports
Club, an organization largely consisting of younger members of the community.  The Sports Club leadership
then attempted to widen the base of support in the community enlisting the help of the church and by
forming a Citizens Association with a group of interested parents.  The Sports club leader says that the
process of galvanizing the community around the project was not easy and "to ensure broad support for
participation the community had to be educated about the project."  "It was a difficult process, but through
public education (the sports club) was able to the community totally involved."  Ultimately,  according the
Sports Club leader, "the Church was not as actively involved as it was hoped."
The Citizens Association, on the other hand, raised a substantial amount of money from the
community, even prior to the JSIF intervention. Once JSIF approved the project, it helped organized work-
days, dug the foundation and built a driveway and parking area.  It also played a key role in assisting the
contractor to acquire building materials on credit from local hardware merchants.  The community was,
therefore, very actively involved in the project in all its phases.  Their contribution  far exceeded the
minimum 5  per cent required by JSIF. This allowed enough funds to be left over a canteen to be constructed
entirely out of community  funds after the school was constructed.
19The impact of the project on the community has been favorable though the prognosis is mixed.
Focus  group discussions seem to echo the rhetoric of participation.  They say that have learned the "idea of a
community learning to work together for the good of the entire community."  They add that the project
motivated  "the community to work together for the good of everyone," and that  "Team work is necessary to
accomplish goals.  The local Councilor tells us that "successful conclusion of the project served to
strengthen the sense of community."  However, the councilor also says that it has led to "rivalries"  between
the Sports Club, the church and the PTA.  Furthermore,  he is "not sure who is responsible for ongoing
maintenance  and operation."  The Principal does not know whom to turn to for this and there is no school
board in place and project committee's present role needs to be clarified.  This leads to questions about how
sustainable the project is.  The Sports Club leader reiterates this point saying, "Currently there is confusion
about who is responsible for the sustainability of the school." There is a "need for more community effort
now that the project is completed to ensure  that the building and grounds are properly maintained.  Support
can only be gotten if the community sees the benefits."
From all of this one gets the sense that the community was very well organized in obtaining funds
for the project.  There was a commonly felt need when the school was destroyed.  One also gets the sense
that the traditional leadership in the community did not make enough efforts to restore the school and this
created space for the Sports Club to exercise leadership and mobilize the community.  The JSIF process was
clearly well suited to this purpose and Rock Creek, as a motivated,  well-organized  community obtained the
funds easily.  However,  once the project was completed, there was clearly some confusion as to who is
responsible  for the facilities operation and maintenance.  The normal procedure is for the School Board to
take over these functions, but no such body was formed.  Consequently there were some tensions between
the Church - representing the traditional authority figures in the community, and the Sports Club, despite
their central role in getting the project started, may be losing power in the eyes of the community back to
Church.
The matching community for Rock Creek is Creighton  which is located a few miles and has similar
socio-economic  characteristics.  The community  is said to be fairly united with two very active youth clubs.
They have recently helped form a District Development Committee consisting of participants  from the youth
clubs and other individuals active in community activities.  The church,  however, is not involved in these
activities and does not seem to play an active role in the development of the village.  Focus group
discussions explained that while the "Community is minimally involved,"  "those that attend meetings are
mostly young people because  they have time on their hands."  Some also felt that the "Community not very
united, politics divide the community during elections."  Others believed that despite  strong political
divisions, the village was relatively harmonious.
20Some of this lack of collective action capacity has affected the community's ability to apply for JSIF
funds.  We were told that the "conmmunity did not apply for JSIF because there was no consensus on which
project was a priority...."  On the other hand community members have worked together on a road
construction project and are presently providing voluntary labor excavating land from the hillside to build a
play field.
Perhaps the most important distinguishing factor between Rock Creek and Creighton is that
Creighton does not have a single  important problem, like the school destroyed by fire, that is able to unite
the community in an effort to deal with it.  In Rock Creek the lack of a school motivated young people in the
Sports Club to work hard to galvanize the community  to organize itself and apply for JSIF funds.  Creighton
on the hand, suffers from several problems, the lack of adequate water, poor roads, the lack of a school
building, and there is no clear sense of which of these is a priority.  The multiple problems serve to divide
the community rather than unite it.
Summarizing the Oualitative Evidence:
In interpreting the qualitative evidence  it helps to reiterate the point that the information is based
upon interviews with a few key informants in each community, and focus group discussions.  Since the
focus groups were not selected on the basis of a probability  sample, it is possible that the views they present
may not be representative.  The qualitative  evidence therefore should be evaluated in conjunction with the
quantitative evidence,  which is based on a random sample, to get a comprehensive sense of the impact of the
project on the community.
The qualitative data indicate that the Social Fund had, overall, a positive impact on each of the five
communities in our sample.  JSIF generally follows a procedure where careful social analysis precedes the
design of a project.  While the community is generally well informed about the project, participation  for the
sake of participation does not seem to be the highest priority.  In the case of Arnett Gardens and Port Royal,
for instance, levels of participation were very low.  Community members were given the opportunity to
attend meetings where they were given information about the project, but this does not mean that they had a
voice in the choice of the project.  The focus group interviews seem to indicate that many would have
preferred a different type of project - usually one that generates private goods like more jobs.
However, Jamaica's political culture, and the many divisions that exist within its communities may
make the participatory process difficult to implement in a manner that is truly inclusive.  Typically a leader
within the community receives support from one faction within the community and not with another.  This
creates a situation where the project tends to incorporate the interests of one sub-group of the population
while ignoring the others.  This in turn has the potential to both generate a project that benefits many
21members of the community,  but simultaneously reinforce divisions within it, as we saw in Port Royal and
Virginia.  The question that should be asked is whether participation within a heterogeneous,  divided,
community is possible or even desirable.  A truly participatory process was perhaps impossible in a
community such as Arnett Gardens.  Participation in this case was substituted by careful social analysis that
helped inform the development of a project that,  at least for a while, had a positive effect on the community.
This suggests that what really seems to matter is a deep knowledge of the social, political and economic
forces underlying a community - whether this comes from "participation"  or social  analysis.  Thoughtful
investigation - whether done by "listening" to the community  or by simply listening to good social  scientists
can result in effective project design.
Divided communities also create the pre-conditions for capture.  However, despite the lack of full
participation,  what we see in each of these cases is not capture but what one World Bank official5 calls
"benevolent capture."  This describes a situation where  influential individuals within a community push
through a project and dominate its progress, but do it with communitarian motives which have the effect of
having a generally positive impact.  The point of Community Driven Development is to involve the
community in a development intervention so to create a better match between the community's needs and
the project it obtains.  How this is achieved  is perhaps of secondary importance.  It helps to have a wide
menu from which to choose from which, JSIF, to its, credit,  seems to allow for.  The Tony Spaulding
stadium, the Virginia basic school, and the New Valley road project are cases in point.  Participation,  as in
the case of Virginia and New Valley by having communities  send applications which are then vetted and
checked - is one way to achieve this goal.  But, as the Tony Spaulding  stadium demonstrates, this may not
always make sense in communities that are more difficult to work in because of severe social disruption.
To summarize, we have learned from the qualitative analysis that the CDD process is often
dominated by a sub-set of the population  mobilized by a local leader who may or may not be a politician.
The process of project selection is not generally participatory but is driven by the opinions of this small
motivated group. Once construction  commences,  however, we see that this group is often able to motivate a
larger group in the community to participate by making contributions to the project.  Once  the facility has
been completed, it is generally positively viewed and seen as something that belongs to the community -
that was constructed with the community's active support and participation.  Given that the process of
project selection is dominated by a small group, it would be interesting to see if participation was selective
and exclusionary.  Note that this general pattern  does not apply to Arnett Gardens, which is essentially an
"informed" top-down project where carefully social analysis preceded the design and implementation  of the
facility.  Arnett Gardens also reminds us that the positive social  externalities that arise from a community
based intervention - however well designed - may be difficult to sustain in the long term in communities
22that are beset by deep divisions.  We willinow turn to the quantitative data explore these issues greater detail.
We will examine the determinants of participation,  and see the extent to which community interactions and
the capacity for collective action have been affected by the social fund.  We will therefore understand the
extent to which our qualitative findings can be generalized to the population. We will also attempt to
examine the causal impact of the social fund process on the community's  capacity for collective action and
participation.
3. Ouantitative Data and Methodoloav
Each of the five pairs of communities described above have been matched on the basis of observable
characteristics  such as the availability of public services and levels of poverty,  but the field visits also helped
match them on "unobservables"  such as their geography,  political culture and social structure.  Within each
community, fifty households were selected at random to be administered the questionnaire.  Within each
household  an attempt was made to interview two adults: the head of the household and one another
randomly chosen member of the opposite sex to the household head.  In practice, Jamaica's family
structure, which tends to be have a large proportion of single parent households, made it difficult to locate
the second adult in many households.  Therefore we have a sample of about 500 households with 684
individuals,  spread evenly between social fund and non social  fund communities.
The questionnaires that were administered to these households covered issues that ranged from
socio-economic  characteristics,  experience with community based activities and participation in projects
prior to the introduction of the social fund, sources of information prior, networks, perceptions of problems
in the community, information and knowledge about the social fund, level of participation in community and
social activities, and a series of questions that asked respondents to evaluate changes from five years ago to
the present on a series of outcome variables (the social funds started operating in these communities  in
1997).  The questionnaires  for the social fund and non-social fund communities were similar, the only
difference being that social fund communities were asked an additional  set of questions that were unique to
the social  fund process.  The analysis will focus on two sets of dependent variables - one set will analyze
targeting and participation  focussing on data from the social fund communities, the second set will compare
social fund to non-social fund communities in order to tease out the impact of the social fund on changes in
various indicators of the capacity for collective action.
Our data suffers from two important problems, common to many impact evaluations, that affect our
ability to determine the causal impact of the social fund program:
5Aniruddha Dasgupta who manages urban CDD projects in Indonesia.
23A) Since the access to the social fund was not randomly assigned we are not able to observe what would
have happened to a community had it not received assistance  from JSIF.
B) We do not have direct observations  on the communities prior to the introduction of the social fund.
To elaborate  on these concerns and to outline how we attempt to find solutions to them we will
briefly sketch the elements of the impact evaluation problem using Ravallion's  (2000) notation:
Let I1be the impact of the Social Fund on individual  i. Then, I; = Y,  - Yoi I  Pi =1  . Where Yli  is the
outcome of interest for individual i when that individual belongs to a community that received treatment  1.
Yoi is the outcome when the same individual belongs to a community that did not receive the treatment.  This
is conditional on Pi =1, i.e. the probability  that the individual belongs to a community that received the
treatrnent is 1. In other words, the true impact of the social fund is measured by looking at the difference
between the outcome with the social fund intervention  and the outcome without the social fund intervention,
for the same individual in the same community.  Obviously,  till cloning technologies become more cost
effective,  this is never observable.  That is, we can never observe Yoi  when Pi =1;  the outcome of what
would have happened had the treatment not been received in a community that received the treatment.  This
is crux of the problem with program evaluation.
The ideal solution to this problem is to do a random assignment which, on average,  will give us the
correct answer.  If we define the expected value of the impact as:
I = E(Y,i - Yoi I  Pi =1) = E(Y1i I  Pi =1) - E( Yoi I  Pi =1).
Then, if the social fund was assigned randomly to a group of communities which constituted the treatment
group, while the rest were left as controls,  so long as the sample was randomly drawn we can assume
E(Yo; I  Pi =1) = E( Yoi I  Pi =0).  The expected value of the outcome without a social fund in the treatment
group would be the same as the expected value of the outcome without a social  fund in the experimental
group.  We would then get an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect.  However,  we know that
Social Funds were not randomly assigned.  In fact, JSIF explicitly states that they have a pro-poor bias.  One
way around this is to select matched pairs of communities  which are very similar so that we can assume
E(Yoi I  Pi =1) = E(  YO; I Pi =0) with some degree of comfort.
This, however, is imperfect.  For example,  looking at the qualitative  work we see that while Port
Royal is similar to its matched community Rennock Lodge, Rennock Lodge does not share Port Royal's
unique history and social structure.  This problem has a solution if we assume that the differences  between
the matched pairs are time invariant.  In other words, we can assume that the kinds of things that make
Rennock Lodge different from Port Royal do not change over time - a safe assumption since much of what
makes them different is related to their uniqueness as communities which is unlikely to change rapidly over
time.  If the source of bias is time invariant, and if we have observations on these communities over time
preferably before and after the introduction of the social fund in the experimental  community, we can take
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can then take another difference  across the experimental and control matched pairs to get a better estimate of
the causal impact of the social fund.  This gives us the difference in difference  estimate:
I = E(Y;,  - yi-.-  1_ P  = 1)  -E(Yoi  - Yo-  I  P =0)  = E(AYj  I  P =1)  -E(AYj  I  P =0O)
In our data we do not have direct observations of these communities before the introduction of JSIF
but we asked respondents a series of retrospective questions  about life five years before March 2000, which
takes us to a period the year before JSIF was introduced to get a sense of initial conditions.  We also asked
them to directly assess how their lives have changed for a series of outcome variables from five years ago to
the present and therefore provide a direct measure of AYi in both pairs of communities.  This is an imperfect
solution since memories are sometimes poor, but it in the absence of  panel data it provides one way of
deriving estimates of change.
This method, however,  does not allow to assess how different individuals are differentially  affected
by the change.  While it may be safe to assume that the differences  in the two matched pairs of communities
are time invariant, it may be more difficult to assume the same for individuals in those communities.  We
know that if unobservable  characteristics  change over time our difference  in difference  estimates will still be
biased.  Also, it may be interesting to examine how particular characteristics of individuals  affect changes in
outcomes,  and how those characteristics  may be affected by the social fund process.  For instance we may
interested in know if better educated individuals are more likely to participate in group meetings, and if the
social fund process has a greater impact on better educated people.
In order to find a solution to the problem of bias due to time-variant unobserved heterogeneity and
to get a better sense of how the program effects varied across individual we will employ propensity score
matching methods.  The idea behind the propensity score (Rubin 1973,  Rosenbaum and Rubin  1983) is to
create an index that summarizes the exogenous observable attributes of an individual.  When this index is
generated for the individuals  in both the experimental  and control groups, individuals in the experimental
group can be paired with their statistical clones in the control group.  If the observational and control
samples are very different the propensity score will also identify individuals who have no corresponding
match - that this they will lie outside the common support of the propensity score in the experimental  and
control  samples.  These individuals outside the common support are dropped to reduce bias in the estimate
of the impact.  To summarize we will calculate  a propensity score on the basis of the following equation:
(l)  Pi = f (Hi, Xi, Ci)
Where Pi is the probability that the individual  belongs to a social fund community.  H is a vector of
exogenous household characteristics,  X is a vector of exogenous measures of behavior of the household
related to participation prior to the introduction of the social fund, and C is a dummy variable for each pair
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age and its square, whether the respondent is less than 25 years old, the household size, the number of
earning members of the family,  the highest level of education in the family, the number of children of school
going age, whether the individual  is Rastafarian, whether s/he is Protestant, whether s/he is a permanent
resident of the community who has not migrated  from elsewhere, whether the respondent is married or
unemplo'yed,  and the household's economic  status.  Economic  status is a principal component measure of a
set of asset based variables using the method suggested by Filmer and Pritchett (2001),  since the surveys did
not ask questions on income  or expenditure.  The method for calculating the economic status variable is
outlined in Appendix  A.
In the vector X we include: the level of participation in community activities prior to JSIF, their
primary method of socialization - whether they meet other members of the community primarily in
community activities like PTA meetings, or whether they meet them through traditional activities  such as
weddings and funerals, the number of influential people they knew within the community prior to JSIF, and
the number of influential people they knew outside the community prior to JSIF.  C includes dummy
variables for each pair of communities  analyzed in the qualitative section.
Equation (1) is estimated with a logistic regression, and the predicted probability  Pi calculated from
the estimated logit regression  is the propensity score.  As explained above, it can be viewed as a summary
measure of all the exogenous variables in equation (1).  As we will see below, because the pairs of
communities have been matched closely during the sampling process the overlap between observations in
the social fund and non-social fund samples  is quite large which means that only a small percentage needs to
be trimmed.  However, dropping these extreme observations substantially reduces the bias in the estimated
impact of the program (Heckman et.al.,  1998).
We will analyze the impact of the intervention using nearest neighbor matching.  Each observation
in the social fund sample will be matched on the basis of the propensity score with its "nearest neighbor"  in
the non-social fund sample.  Since the sample size is rather small, in practice, it is difficult to find an exact
match and we therefore take the average of the five nearest neighbors  from the control sample.  The
difference between the observation in the treatment sample and its matched (averaged) nearest neighbor in
the control sample provides an estimate of Ii . The average of all the Ii provides an estimate of I the average
treatment effect.  Studies have shown that this average treatment effect provides results that are close to
those obtained from a randomized trial (Dehejia and Wahba,  1998).  We will also examine the impact of the
impact on the social  fund on intervening variables by calculating  the nearest neighbor I for sub-groups of the
population divided by education,  age, economic status, and gender.  We calculate bootstrapped standards
errors for the nearest neighbor estimates to test whether the estimates of I are significantly different from
zero.  The nearest neighbor method provides the closest approximation  to results from a random assignment
26and, unlike regression based methods, does not make any assumptions about the parametric relationship
between the intervention and the outcome variables. In our view, it is therefore the preferred method to
assess the impact of the social fund.  Thus we employ two methods - difference in difference  with matched
samples of difference  in difference  with propensity score nearest neighbor matching to provide  estimates of
the impact of the social fund.  This in combination with the qualitative evidence will provide an in-depth and
comprehensive examination of the relationship between social funds and outcomes of interest.
The outcome variables we examine include:  Have respondents heard of JSEF, Compared to five
years ago whether it is easier now to work with groups and associations of people outside the immediate
household, compared  to five ago has there been a change in the level of trust in the community,  compared to
five years ago is it more easy to get the entire community to agree on a decision,  five years ago were you
more or less likely to be fined or penalized for not participating in community activities, compared to five
years ago is the government more responsive to your needs, compared to five years  ago is the local
leadership more responsive to your needs, compared to five years ago are community decisions made more
or less often by community leaders, and compared to five years ago are community decisions  made more or
less often by community meetings with a vote.
In addition to measuring the impact of the social  fund, we are also interested in studying the
determinants of participation within the social fund process.  To examine this we focus on the entire social
fund sample, without trimming.  We will first begin by examining how close the project that each
community obtained was to the expressed preferences of members.  Each individual  in the social fund
sample was asked to rank order the three most important problems that they faced prior  to the introduction
of the project.  The question was relatively open-ended allowing for a whole range or responses.  These
responses were then coded into categories that could be associated with interventions - such as education,
roads, income  generation, etc.  We then focus on the problem that was listed as the most important by the
respondents and rank orders  the categories by the number of "votes" they receive6. The sample is then split
into high and low levels of education,  economic status, age and gender to see if the "votes" change for
different types of individuals.
Finally, we run reduced form regressions on a variety of indicators of participation  in the Social
Fund process with the same set of exogenous variables as in equation (1).  The indicators of participation  we
use include:  Whether they had a meeting to decide about the project, whether they participated in any
meetings during the course of the construction,  and whether the JSIF project addressed the problem that was
ranked as the most important by the respondent.
6 We also tried a "proportional voting"  system by using all three responses and calculating  a weighted vote with the
highest weight given to the first problem, the second problem received 50% of  the weight of the first problem and the
third problem receiving 33% of the weight.  This produced very similar results to the "majority vote" system and is
therefore not reported  for the sake of brevity.
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Table  1 provides summary statistics for the exogenous  variables for the social fund and non-social
fund communities.  We see that the two samples are quite similar - none of the variables  in the samples
significantly different from each other - indicating that the quality of the match in the pairs of communities
is good.  The average age of a respondent is 45.3 (46.8 in the non social  fund sample).  The mean highest
level of education in a household  is 10.14 years (9.97 in the non social fund sample).  Interestingly  a little
more than 50% of the sample consists of female headed households, which is consistent with demographic
pattems in Jamaica.  Prior to the inception of the social fund, participation in development projects was
slightly higher in non-social fund communities,  where the average household had participated in 1.87
projects prior to JSEF  compared to 1.76 projects in JSIF communities.  Non-JSIF communities had more
frequent contact with their local leaders than JSIF communities.  On average, JSIF communities  are
acquainted with  1.42 influential people within the community while this average  is 1.06 for matched
communities.  Non-JSIF communities, on average, knew 1.35 influential people outside their community
compared to 1.21 for JSIF communities7.
Table 8 reports the results from the propensity score regression - equation (1).  Smaller households
and migrants are more likely to belong to social fund communities.  Individuals  with higher levels of
participation are less likely to belong to social fund communities,  as are those who have participated in non-
JSIF projects.  Individuals well connected to leaders within the community are more likely to be in a social
fund community, while those who have daily or weekly access to local  leaders or connections to VIPs
outside the community, are less likely to receive JSIF funds.  Since the amount of community level  variation
is small, it difficult to read much into this regression but it does seem to suggest that individuals who have
more experience with CDD projects are less likely to be in communities  that receive social funds. To
compare the JSIF and non-JSIF communities, Kernel densities for the propensity scores for both
communities were plotted (Figure  1). Their curvature is similar, again indicating  a good quality match.
When the observations  are trimmed to drop those outside the common support, we lose about  10 per cent of
the sample in both the JSIF and non-JSIF samples and, as expected, differences between them substantially
decrease  (Table 1).
Before working with the trimmed sample, we will analyze the complete JSIF community sample  to
investigate how well targeted the projects were and to examine the determinants of participation  in the JSIF
process.  One of the important potential benefits of community driven development is its demand-
7The variable "Influential people" is  constructed by asking respondents  whether they had frequent  contact with a series
of people such as the Mayor, pastor, extension worker, etc. It is,  therefore,  not self-defined.
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match between  what the community needs and the project that it obtains.  The qualitative work, however,
indicated that because communities were divided - usually because of politics but also for other reasons -
projects were not really "participatory."  They were driven by local leaders who, via a process of
"benevolent capture," mobilized a few members of the community to obtain JSIF funding and, in the case of
Arnett Gardens, the project was initiated entirely by outsiders.
To examine how close the project matched the expressed preferences of the community we
construct a targeting indicator based on a question in the survey questionnaire  that asked respondents to list
the three most important problems they faced prior five years before the survey.  While the responses were
quite diverse, we categorized them to approximate  a type of intervention.  For instance, whether the problem
was "the school does not have a roof," or that "the teachers  in the school are not good," they were both
categorized  as "school" problems.  These categorized  responses were then tabulated to reflect a "majority
vote" process, and a "weighted vote" process as described above.
Table 2 reports the results.  The JSIF process resulted in a relatively imperfect match between the
community's  expressed needs and the project that was obtained - the category of needs that match with the
project that was obtained  are in bold.  Two communities,  Arnett Gardens and New Valley/Orange  received
their top priority project,  as suggested by the qualitative  evidence,  while the other three did not.
Furthermore, communities that did not receive  their most preferred project received projects that were
ranked relatively low in their list of initial priorities.  This is true whether one assumes that group decisions
were made by majority vote which counts the most important problem, or whether the top three needs were
counted  in weighted proportional vote.  On explanation for this could be that most important problems were
often private goods - lack of credit and income generation for instance - which the social fund was unable to
sponsor.  But, even if we focus on public goods such as lack of water, health, poor roads, etc, we still see
that the facility that was obtained is ranked very low.  This is partly because of the menu that JSIF offers is
usually restricted to health clinics, schools, water and road projects.  However, even  focussing on this
narrow menu we still see that in three out five cases priorities  that could have been addressed under the JSEF
menu were ranked higher than the project that was obtained.  Thus the evidence  for community drivenness  is
rather poor.  The preferences  of the majority of the community did not seem to play a part in determining the
project in the majority of the communities.
Moving to Table 5 we see a pattern as to whose votes count by examining if an individual's
preferences  matched with the project that was obtained.  Looking at all three expressed needs we see that, in
a cross-tab, people of higher education were more likely to have expressed a need that was associated with
the facility that was obtained.  This pattern is even clearer if we focus  only on the most important need. In
the estimates reported  in Table 6 we see that better off families with lower family size who were permanent
29residents were  more likely to have their priority needs satisfied.  Networks also seem to matter as people
with greater access to local leaders who were more sociable were also more likely to obtain their highest
priority project.
However, even if a project does not address the priority needs of a majority in the community, it still
may be a successful intervention  if, via a process of benevolent capture, the community is ultimately
mobilized and satisfied by the project.  This is suggested by Table 7 which analyzes whether respondents
said that they would have ultimately preferred another project.  The table shows that 82 per cent would not
have preferred another project.  The regression results here do not show a significant relationship with
almost all the variables indicating that there is no clear socio-economic  group that was more satisfied with
the project.  Networks, and proximity to community leaders also does not seem to matter.  Contrasting Table
7 with the targeting tables, one gets the sense that while the projects did not meet the ex-ante expressed
preferences of the community, ultimately most people were satisfied with the choice.  Therefore, the CDD
process suggests a process of information transmission and persuasion by a small group of individuals who
are associated with the leadership.  While ex-ante targeting is poor, and the participation process relatively
exclusionary,  most in the community seem satisfied with the end result.
Table 3 provides estimates of a regression of whether the community had a meeting to decide about
the project.  Since four of the communities  had at least one meeting about the project, this is as much an
indicator of an individual's information about the role of JSIF in the community as it is an indicator of
participation.  Note that only 53%  of respondents gave a positive response to the question.  We see that age
has a quadratic effect on this with a negative sign at the mean.  Thus younger people are better informed on
average but the very young are as ill informed as the old.  As expected,  individuals  in Arnett Gardens are the
least likely to have had a meeting.  Families with more earners,  more experience  with participation, and with
better connections to leaders within the community on the other hand are more likely to have heard about the
project.  This suggests that there is a small core group of people in the community who tend to participate in
development  activities, who also may be well connected with the local leadership.
Having examined  the extent of knowledge about JSIF meetings and the congruence between
people's preferences and the project that they obtained, we turn to studying the determinants of participation
in the JSIF decision making process.  First we will look at who participated in Social Fund meetings.  Table
4 provides some insights into this (with 27 per cent of the sample reporting that they had participated in at
least one meeting)  Here we see that individual  socio-economic characteristics  do not seem to matter as
much as experience with participation.  Non-Migrants,  people who participated in projects prior to JSIF, and
those who are well connected with leaders within and outside the community are more likely to have
attended  a meeting.  Note, once again that Arnett Gardens has the lowest level of participation.  This once
again suggests that active participants  tend to be a small groups of motivated people who tend to be active in
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participate they do not necessarily  obtain their priority projects.  This raises the possibility that the non-poor
may benefit more from participation than the poor.
The picture that emerges about targeting and participation  in the JSIF process is, therefore, quite
clear.  Participation seems to have been restricted to a small group of active individuals who were close to
the community leaders and were highly motivated.  The entire process is best characterized  as benevolent
capture.  It was not a broad based community driven process but pushed and activated by a few local leaders
who nevertheless seemed to be doing it for reasons that benefited the community.  Their private reasons for
doing so are unclear, but obtaining the JSIF project clearly enhanced their stature within the community.  In
Arnett Gardens,  we have a special case where participation  was practically non-existent  and the entire
process was driven by outsiders - in that sense it could be called informed top down.  Arnett Gardens  was
also the best targeted of the projects in that it attempted to address the most important concern of the vast
majority of community members.  New Valley/Orange,  as shown in the qualitative section, was also well
targeted in that the community received a project that addressed its most pressing need - a good road.  The
other projects in our sample, on the other hand, were extremely poorly targeted and would have performed
abysmally in a vote.  Moreover,  targeting also seems to have not been pro-poor with better educated and
better networked individuals  much more likely to receive  their preferred project.  One reason for the
education effect, however,  was that three of the five projects in our sample are school renovations which are
likely to have been favored by more educated members of the community.  However, ex-ante only 20 per
cent of respondents would have preferred another project. Therefore,  while the CDD process may have been
exclusionary with poor ex-ante targeting,  once the project had been completed and was functioning most in
the community seemed satisfied by the choice.
We now shift focus to examining the impact of the social fund project on the community.  We will
use data from both the JSIF and non-JSIF communities trimming observations  outside the common support
of the propensity score from both samples.  Each outcome variable that we look at will be examined in two
different ways - cross-tabs (which provide a diff;rence  in difference estimator with matched  samples when
the outcome variable is a retrospective  question on changes over time) and difference in difference  with
propensity-score nearest neighbor matching.  We first begin examining the set of outcome variables
expressed in terms of changes from five years ago, prior to the introduction of JSIF.  Table 9 examines if
respondents  find it more easy or more difficult to participate in groups or associations of people outside their
immediate households.  The cross-tabs show a clear JSIF impact,  as do the nearest neighbor estimates.  The
JSIF process clearly seems to make it easier for people to work with other members of the community.
However, the nearest neighbor estimates show a significant wealth effect suggesting that JSIF may have
created more collective action capacity among the rich than among the poor which against suggests an
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capacity of the relatively well off to engage in collective action.
Table 10 reports results from an analysis of changes in levels of trust.  Trust is not an easy concept
to define or measure.  The question did not attempt any explanation  of the word but simply asked if "levels
of trust and community cooperation"  changed, before and after the JSIF, between people from different
backgrounds  in the community.  This is relatively vague,  and the results should be interpreted  with caution
and examined in conjunction with the other outcome variables.  However, since English is Jamaica's official
language and is widely spoken and understood, the English word "trust" is likely to have been understood in
similar ways by all the respondents in the five pairs of communities.  The cross-tab results tell us that trust
has slightly increased in the JSIF community,  a finding that is confirmed by the propensity  score results.
The nearest neighbor estimates also present evidence to suggest that the increases in trust may have been
significantly higher for those who identified themselves  as Protestant emphasizing the important role of the
church in Jamaica's communities.
Table  11  examines a related question - compared  to five years  ago is it now more difficult or easy to
get the entire community to agree on a decision.  The difference in difference cross-tabs  show a slightly
positive JSIF effect, but the nearest-neighbor  estimates show a small but insignificant  effect.  The nearest
neighbor estimates, moreover, also suggest that any improvements  in the ability to reach collective  decisions
were more likely to have been realized by better networked and employed  individuals.  Thus, we can infer
that while JSIF did not have much of an impact on improving the ability of individuals to reach collective
agreements, these changes were more likely to have been realized by economically more  stable and better
networked individuals.
Examining these collective action variables as a group, it does suggest that the JSIF process has built
the community's  capacity for collective action by enabling the community to work together  as a group
across people of different backgrounds,  and by increasing trust.  How sustainable this will be is less clear.
The projects are new and the community's experience  with collective action in the construction  and
management  process is still fresh in their minds.  But, we have already seen warning signs in Rock Creek
and Arnett Gardens that this improvement in collective action may not be sustainable.  This lack of
sustainability has a historical precedent in Jamaica's history with the Jamaica Welfare  Society, where
interest and support in the cooperative movement withered away as fashions changed and prime movers
passed on.  The vestiges of the Society either died or became entrenched  as part of the elite - as in the case
of the Port Royal Brotherhood.  Therefore a question still remains whether the burst in enthusiasm  for
collective  action generated by the social fund will prove resilient over the long term.  It should be kept in
minded that any new innovation within a community is likely to generate some enthusiasm and "a spirit of
ecumenism" to quote the New Valley focus group.  Furthermore, if the capacity for collective action that is
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initiatives, it is likely to turn very quickly to disillusionment.  JSIF, like most Social Funds,  is financially
constrained and potentially unlikely to have the resources to permit a community to apply for a second
project.  Unless this is rectified,  the CDD process may have the potential to result in a level of
disillusionment that is perhaps even greater than in regular top-down projects because of the level of hope
that CDD engineers within activist groups in a community.
We now turn to perceptions of how the process of decision mraking within the community has
changed,  and the effectiveness of leadership and governance.  Table  12 asks if respondents believe that
community leaders are more responsive to their needs.  Since the qualitative  data revealed that the CDD
process was often driven by local leaders - both formal and informal  -this question checks to see if their
efforts have resulted in a perception of greater responsiveness.  The data show no JSIF effect either in the
cross-tabs or the nearest neighbor estimates.  The nearest neighbor estimates show, however,  that JSIF
effect is stronger for younger individuals, those who are married and those who are better networked outside
the community.  Therefore, while JSIF does not seem to have increased overall perceptions of community
leader effectiveness,  it was more likely to have done so with younger, married and better networked
individuals.
Table 13 provides an interesting contrast - examining whether community decisions  are now more
likely to be made by community leaders.  Here we see a positive JSIF effect both in the cross-tabs and the
propensity score nearest neighbor estimates.  The nearest neighbor results also reveal that less educated and
older individuals  are more likely to report that decisions are made more by community leaders.  Also notice
that non-JSIF communities have also seen an increase  in the role of the community leader, suggesting that
there is a decentralization process at work in Jamaica that seems to be affecting communities  regardless of
their contact with JSIF.  Tables 12 and  13 together indicate that the power of community leaders has
increased in all communities, but particularly so in JSIF communities.  However,  this increased power is not
perceived by the community to have increased the community leader's responsiveness and effectiveness.
They do not seem to be getting credit for JSIF initiatives despite the fact that they are so strongly driven by
community leaders.
Table  14 focuses on changes in the role of the community in making decisions - on issues of
"voice" by reporting results on changes in decisions made by community vote.  The variable does not show
a JSIF impact - there is no discernable difference between JSIF and non-JSIF communities on community
decisions with vote.  However, perceptions of improvements in democratic decision making are more likely
to have been reported by younger individuals.  Respondents with access to important people within the
community are also more likely to perceive an improvement,  again indicating that better networked people
are more likely to have been consulted about community decisions in this process.  Note again, that both
33JSIF and non-JSIF  show an increase  in democratic decision making over the period suggesting that
community driven mechanisms may be making inroads in Jamaica outside the JSIF initiative as well as
within it.
Conclusion  and Policv Implications
The overall  sense that we get of the impact of JSIF on the capacity for collective action is consistent
across both the qualitative and quantitative data.  JSIF does seem to have had a social impact - trust has
increased,  and people from JSIF communities  are more likely now to be able to work with strangers in
making community-based  decisions.  However, the JSIF process does not seem to have been very
democratic with community leaders dominating decision- making.  The data suggest that JSIF may have
strengthened  the hand of community leaders.  When leaders  are benevolent this could be a good thing, but if
they are corrupt then this could result in bad outcomes.  In these communities - overall - they seem to have
been leaders who had the best interests of the community at heart.  While it seems that respondents  are for
the most part happy with the project and with JSIF, and that JSIF has built good feelings within the
community,  it is not clear that the JSIF process has democratized decision making, any more than other
processes present in Jamaica.  It also seems to have improved the capacity for collective action, but whether
these improvements  will be sustained  over the long run is unclear.
Community Driven Development does not seem to have succeeded  in doing what is touted to be one
of its main advantages - to improve the match between what the community needs and the projects that it
obtains.  We see that perhaps because  the CDD process is dominated by small group of motivated
individuals mobilized by a leader, targeting is very poor with three of the five communities not obtaining the
project that would have been preferred by a majority.  Ironically,  one of the two cases where the match
between community preferences and the project was well done was essentially a top-down project - the
stadium in Arnett Gardens.  However,  this could be characterized  as "informed top-down."  Extensive social
analysis led to a project designed to address the most compelling need of the community - its plague of
violence.  Since the community was so fragmented and conflict ridden, participation  would have been very
difficult to achieve.  Thus project implementation was entirely top-down with JSIF and an local NGO hiring
the contractor,  supervising the construction,  with the community not making any contributions.
Consultations with the community were the result of PPA and focus group discussions conducted by a team
of anthropologists - no one was mobilized or had to attend any meetings.  This suggests that good social
analysis could substitute for a community driven participatory process, particularly in complex,
heterogeneous  communities.  The other altemative  could be to simply subject a project menu to a secret
ballot within the community or to conduct a needs assessment.  However,  by the end of the JSIF process,
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primarily a process of persuasion and learning.
One potentially worrying finding indicated by the quantitative data is that better off, better
networked individuals  seem to dominate the participation process and receive  their preferred projects.
Moreover, they are also more likely to develop collective action skills.  This suggests that the CDD process
in Jamaica may compound existing inequities and even perpetuate them by enhancing the ability of the
better educated and better off to work more effectively  as a group.  The fact that community leaders are not
perceived to be more effective but are perceived to have a greater say in decisions as a result of the JSIF
process, particularly by less educated individuals,  also provides some evidence of a bias against the poor.
This may not be intentional, but is the result of a process that requires a high level of literacy and political
awareness to obtain a successful outcome.  One open question that remains is whether the collective  action
skills built within a section of the community results in more sustainable projects.  Since none of the
facilities are more than three years old, and it is difficult to find a comparable  counterfactual  for them, it is
difficult to tell if facilities assisted by the social fund are better run and better managed.
Community Driven Development is clearly no panacea.  In societies that are sharply divided,  it is
difficult to achieve consensus  on projects that meet the priority needs of the majority of the community.
This may increase the possibility of "capture."  A few educated, motivated,  individuals led by effective
leaders may be able to obtain funds for project that are relatively more beneficial  for them.  Yet, this capture
may be "benevolent" in the sense that such projects may serve to benefit the entire community  in the long
run with the vast majority of individuals in the community ultimately  expressing satisfaction with it.  Does
this compare well with a traditional top-down project?  It is difficult to say with these data, but participation
does seem to create a greater sense of accomplishment  and ownership within the community.  On the other
hand, targeting could be improved by the simple act of instituting  a needs assessment or having the
community vote by secret ballot for a project.  But again, if a project was better targeted, say by a secret
ballot, would we see a group of motivated people work hard to keep it going with a spirit of "ecumenism?"
In other words, if CDD has the potential to provide a community with a school to which everyone  has
access, and which is constructed  and managed by a group of educated and motivated individuals this is not
such a bad thing.  On the other hand, the argument that CDD "empowers the poor" is clearly not indicated
by these data.  There is more evidence  in support of the belief that it improves the capacity for collective
action, but these data are unable to provide unambiguous answers to whether this results in more sustainable
projects.  To answer the sustainability we would require data that has a clear counterfactual  - evidence on
similar facilities provided by a CDD and a non-CDD process, and that are tracked over an extended period
to see how the relationship between participation and sustainability evolves over time.  Such data are, at the
moment,  unavailable.
35APPENDIX A
Principal  Components - Economic Status
Economic  status or household "wealth" can be approximated by an index of assets. Four approaches
can be used to create  an index of economic status.  First, assume equal weights for all the assets.  Second,
impose weights for each asset, like price of the assets. Third, include the assets directly in the regression.
The first two procedures  are arbitrary because they assume weight for each asset. The third procedure  does
not allow us to differentiate from the coefficients the impact of wealth on the final outcome (Filmer and
Pritchett, 2000).  The fourth approach is to use principal components  to determine an index of wealth.
Principal components is a procedure for extracting common  information from a number of variables by
calculating the orthogonal linear combinations of the variables which describes better the common
information.  The assumption is that common variation  in the variables included in the principal components
procedure is caused by wealth.
The asset index that approximates economic  status for household i is defined as
W,=fl *(Wil-W,/a,  +-...+  fn*(Win-W.)/Crn,
where f, is the scoring factor,  wil is the ith household value for the  first asset, w, is the mean for the first
asset and a, is the standard deviation of the first asset.
For Jamaica,  two sets of variables were considered. The first set, defines characteristics of the house
such as roof of concrete or tile and connection to electricity and water.  The second set of variables
represents assets owned by the household.
Table 1. Scoring Factors for Jamaica
Scoring
Factor
Tile Roof  0.1096
Electricity connection  0.3610
Flush Toilet  0.3623
Water Connection  0.3722
Own a car  0.1164
Own other home  0.0550
Own a motorcycle  0.0405
Own a bicycle  0.1599
Own a fan  0.3589
Own a radio  0.2259
Own eold or silver iewelrv  0.2763
Own television  0.3498
Own refrigerator  0.3804
Own major furniture  0.1444
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Propensity Score Before Trimming
A Non-Social Fund Community  o Social Fund Community
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JSEF Comrnunity  Non-JSIF Commninrty
Obs.  Mean  St. Devi  Obs.  Mean  St. Dev
Male respondent  328  0.48  0.50  350  0.47  0.50
Age respondent  314  45.25  17.05  243  46.80  16.78
Male respondent under 25 years  337  0.05  0.21  350  0.06  0.24
Number household earners  337  1.40  0.75  350  1.49  0.68
Household Size  336  3.50  1.95  350  4.32  2.36
HighestleveleducationinHH  332  10.14  3.18  343  9.97  2.83
[Number children schooling age  337  0.90  1.22  350  1.21  1.33
Female headed household  337  0.51  0.50  350  0.53  0.50
Protestant  337  0.79  0.41  350  0.83  0.37
Rastafari  337  0.07  0.25  350  0.04  0.19
Permnanent resident  337  0.20  0.40  350  0.34  0.47
Economic status  337  0.13  1.84  350  -0.17  2.08
Level of participation before JSIF  333  1.76  0.74  347  1.87  0.76
Married  337  0.32  0.47  350  0.33  0.47
Socialize  in community activities  316  0.50  0.50  333  0.47  0.50
Socialize  in traditional activities  316  0.37  0.48  333  0.42  0.49
No socializing  316  0.01  0.08  333  0.02  0.12
Number of VIP within community  337  1.42  1.24  350  1.06  1.02
Number of VIP outside commnunity  337  1.20  1.35  350  1.35  1.36
Summary Statistics after trimming
. ~~~~~~~~~~~JSEF  Commnunity  Non-JSIEF Commrunity
Obs.  Mean  St. DevF  Obs.  Mean  St. Dev
Male respondent  291  0.48  0.50  320  0.49  0.50
Age respondent  283  45.66  17.39  228  46.68  16.98
Male respondent under 25  years  299  0.05  0.22  320  0.07  0.25
Number household earners  299  1.43  0.74  320  1.50  0.66
Household  Size  299  3.58  1.96  320  4.34  2.41
Highest level education in HH  299  10.10  3.19  320  9.92  2.84
Numberchildrenschoolingage  299  0.92  1.22  320  1.18  1.32
Female headed household  299  0.53  0.50  320  0.52  0.50
Protestant  299  0.81  0.40  320  0.84  0.37
Rastafari  299  0.07  0.26  320  0.04  0.20
Permanent resident  299  0.21  0.41  320  0.36  0.48
Economic status  299  0.11  1.83  320  -0.25  2.10
Level of participation before JSIF  295  1.78  0.74  318  1.91  0.77
Married  299  0.33  0.47  320  0.34  0.47
Socialize in community activities  292  0.49  0.50  314  0.45  0.50
Socialize in traditional  activities  292  0.38  0.49  314  0.44  0.50
INo  socializing  292  0.00  0.06  314  0.02  0.13
INurnber of VIP within conrnunity  299  1.37  1.18  320  1.11  1.04
LNumber  of VIP outside community  299  1.22  1.35  320  1.40  1.37Table 2a. Community Needs Before SF- Port Royal and Rennock Lodge
Project: School Improvement  SF Community  Non-SF Community
Before SF  Before  SF
Priorities  Rank  Percent  Rank  Percent
n'ome Generation  1  22%  1  44%
Violence  2  21%  2  17%
HIealth  3  16%  4  3%
Lack/ low supply of water for cattle and crops  4  9%  3  4%
Lack! low supply of drinldng water  5  5%  NV  NV
High Prices  5  5%  NV  NV
Education  6  2%  5  1%
Table 2b. Community Needs  before - Virginia and Downing
Project: School improvement  SF Community  Non-SF Community
Before SF  Before SF
Priorities  Rank  Percent  Rank  Percent
Lack! low supply of drinking water  1  32%  5  1%
Road  2  25%  2  30%
Lack of credit facilities  2  25%  2  30%
Income Generation  3  16%  1  46%
Education  4  4%  3  4%
Lick of telephones  4  4%  NV  NV
Ljghting system  4  4%  NV  NV
Table 2c. Community Needs before SF- Rock Creek
Project:  School Improvement  SF Community
Before SF
Priorities  Rank  Percent
Credit Facilities  1  23%
Lack! low supply of drinking water  1  23%
Lack! low supply of water for cattle and crops  2  18%
Income Generation  3  14%
Lighting system  4  7%
Education  5  2%
Table 2d. Community Needs before SF- Arnett Gardens and Union Gardens
]iNroject:  Stadium renovation  SF Community  Non-SF Community
Before SF  Before SF
Priorities  Rank  Percent  Rank  Percent
Violence  1  58%  2  14%
Income Generation  2  16%  1  52%
Arguments in the community  3  8%  5  1%
Lack of leadership  4  5%  3  4%
Lack! low supply of drinking  water  4  5%  NV  NV
Education  6  3%  4  3%Table 2e. Community Needs  before SF- New Valley/Orange  and S  adow/California
Project: Road Improvement  SF Community  Non-SF Community
Before SF  Before SF
Priorities  Rank  Percent  Rank  Percent
Road  1  39%  2  31%
Lack/ low supply of drinling water  2  34%  1  41%
Income Generation  3  8%  5  5%
Lack/ low supply of water for cattle and crops  4  5%1  3  14%
Violence  5  3%  NV  NVTable 3
Did you  have a meeting  to decide about the project?
JSIF
Yes  59.2  (125,
Total  100.0 (211'
Probit Regression
Variables  Marginal  t-statistic
Male respondent  0.08080  0.75
Age respondent  -0.02590  -1.33
Age respondent  squared  0.00035  1.67
Male respondent under 25 years  -0.17608  -0.67
Numiber household earners  0.13174  1.70
Household Size  0.02947  0.71
Highest level education in HH  0.00647  0.36
Number children schooling age  0.01424  0.22
Female headed household  0.02559  0.23
Protestant  -0.27294  -2.33
Rastafari  -0.11036  -0.50
Permanent resident  0.18852  1.64
New Valley-Orange/Shadow-California  -0.40260  -2.54
Port Royal/Kennock  -0.30973  -1.64
Amette Gardens/Union Gardens  -0.70637  -4.90
Rock Creek/Creighton  -0.53721  -3.11
Economnic status  -0.05251  -1.57
Level of participation before JSIF  0.13390  1.94
Married  0.02429  0.23
Socialize in community activities  0.02815  0.17
Socialize in traditional activities  -0.09047  -0.51
Numnber of VIP within community  0.07251  1.64
Number of VIP outside community  0.02110  0.54
Number of observations  194
Wald test  98.07
Pseudo R-square  0.372Table 4
Participation in Social Fund Meetin!  - Probit Regression
Variables  Marginal  t-statistic
Male respondent  0.093255  1.48
Age respondent  0.003055  0.38
Age respondent squared  -0.000010  -0.14
Male respondent under 25 years  0.086185  0.52
Number household earners  -0.018708  -0.48
Household Size  0.031997  1.38
Highest level education in HH  -0.005635  -0.57
Number children schooling age  -0.014043  -0.42
Female headed household  -0.002901  -0.05
Protestant  -0.011797  -0.14
Rastafari  0.097109  0.64
Permanent resident  0.123033  1.79
New Valley-Orange/Shadow-California  -0.023791  -0.29
Port Royal/Kennock  -0.117366  -1.33
Arnette Gardens/Union Gardens  -0.203641  -2.5
Rock Creek/Creighton  -0.152942  -1.84
Econornic  status  -0.026820  -1.45
Level of participation before JSIF  0.080577  2.04
Married  0.047801  0.8
Socialize in community activities  0.140674  1.32
Socialize in traditional activities  0.025144  0.21
Number of VIP within conmunity  0.068108  2.75
Number of VIP outside community  0.041601  2.03
Number of observations  297
Wald test  73.34
Pseudo R-square  0.254Table 5
Did the SF Project Address the Main Problems of the
Community?
JSIF
Did not address any problem  73.0 (246)
Project addressed third main problem  3.8 (13)
Project addressed second main problem  9.2 (31)
Project addressed first main problem  14.0 (47)
Total
Ordered Probit
Variables  Coefficient  t-statistic
Male respondent  -0.0617  -0.284
Age respondent  -0.0291  -1.112
Age respondent squared  0.0003  1.191
Male respondent under 25 years  0.2572  1.914
Number household earners  -0.2309  -3.332
Household Size  0.0807  2.233
Highest level education in HH  0.2758  2.397
Number children schooling age  0.2314  1.061
Female headed household  0.1195  0.439
Protestant  0.2173  0.564
Rastafari  0.1666  0.547
Permanent resident  -0.1162  -0.335
New Valley-Orange/Shadow-California  0.2110  0.524
Port Royal/Kennock  2.6691  7.159
Amette  Gardens/Union  Gardens  -0.5849  -1.458
Rock Creek/Creighton  -0.0689  -1.027
Economic status  0.0950  0.726
Level of participation before  JSEF  0.2221  1.008
Married  0.1355  0.462
Socialize in community activities  0.3170  1.016
Socialize  in traditional activities  -0.1472  -0.318
Number of VIP within community  0.0269  0.289
Number of VIP outside community  -0.1192  -1.348
Number of observations  299
Wald test  206.08
Pseudo R-square  0.3744Table 6
Targeting - Project Matched the First Priority - Probit
Regression
Variables  Marginal  t-statistic
Male respondent  -0.007448  -0.22
Age respondent  0.003160  0.6
Age respondent squared  -0.000024  -0.45
Male respondent under 25 years
Number household earners  0.034939  1.58
Household Size  -0.025268  -1.88
Highest level education in HH  0.008839  1.42
Number children schooling age  0.006553  0.33
Female headed household  0.025555  0.82
Protestant  -0.074475  -1.34
Rastafari  -0.047292  -1.27
Permanent resident  0.165958  2.43
New Valley-Orange/Shadow-California  -0.058658  -1.32
Port Royal/Kennock  -0.024946  -0.48
Arnette Gardens/Union  Gardens  0.572231  5.53
Rock Creek/Creighton  0.006995  0.55
Economic status  0.034893  1.74
Level of participation before JSIF  0.032005  0.75
Married  -0.103957  -2.34
Socialize in community activities  -0.035111  -0.87
Socialize in traditional activities  0.312179  1.99
Number of VIP within community  0.040328  2.57
Number of VIP outside cormnunity  -0.019895  -1.61
Number of observations  241
Wald test  104.55
Pseudo R-square  0.5088Table 7
Would you have preferred Another Project?
JSIF
No  82.4  (174)
Yes  17.57 (37)
Total  100.0 (211)
Probit -Regression
Variables  Coefficient  t-statistic
Male respondent  0.0131  0.21
Age respondent  -0.0005  -0.05
Age respondent squared  -0.0000  -0.05
Male respondent under 25 years  0.0375  0.24
Number household earners  -0.3254  -0.77
Household  Size  0.0079  0.33
Highest level education in HH  0.0059  0.55
Number children schooling age  -0.0161  0.39
Female headed household  0.0548  0.81
Protestant  -0.1268  -1.45
Rastafari  0.0572  0.41
Permanent resident  -0.1269  -2.04
New Valley-Orange/Shadow-California  0.0224  0.27
Port Royal/Kennock  0.1773  1.37
Amette Gardens/Union  Gardens  -0.0810  -0.98
Rock Creek/Creighton  -0.0260  -0.38
Economic status  -0.0261  1.33
Level of participation before  JSIF  0.0302  0.74
Married  0.4171  0.67
Socialize in community activities  -0.3170  -0.75
Socialize in traditional activities  -0.4620  -0.51
Number of VIP within community  0.0036  0.14
Number of VIP outside community  -0.0051  -0.22
Number of observations  194
Wald test  22.49
Pseudo R-square  0.12Table 8
Propensity Score
Variables  Marginal  t-statistic
Male respondent  -0.0841638  -0.84
Age respondent  0.0086509  0.91
Age respondent  squared  -0.0000692  -0.78
Male respondent under 25 years  0.0391364  0.32
Number household earners  -0.0128123  -0.33
Household Size  -0.0631853  -3.06
Highest level education  in HH  0.0187891  1.92
Number children schooling  age  0.0501981  1.52
Fenale headed household  -0.0476699  -0.48
Protestant  -0.1001048  -1.26
Rastafari  -0.0522881  -0.44
Permanent resident  -0.1186874  -1.96
New Valley-Orange/Shadow-California  -0.2819047  -4.20
Port Royal/Kennock  -0.2224293  -2.57
Amette Gardens/Union Gardens  -0.1989795  -2.27
Rock Creek/Creighton  -0.0430962  -0.57
Economic  status  -0.0011797  -0.07
Level of participation before JSIF  -0.1082521  -3.00
Married  0.0413458  0.73
Socialize  in community activities  -0.0374556  -0.44
Socialize in traditional activities  -0.0603422  -0.69
No socializing  -0.3472967  -1.30
Number of VIP within community  0.0638849  2.54
Number of VIP outside conununity  -0.0325901  -1.55
Number of observations  463
Wald test  70.56
Pseudo R-square  0.1189Table 9
Is it easier now to work with groups and associations of people outside the immediate household?
"Difference  In Difference"  Cross-Tabulations
JSIF  Non-JSIF
Very Difficult  7.48 (22)  7.01  (22
Difficult  13.61  (40)  24.84 (78
Same  21.77 (64  20.06  (63
Easy  37.76(111  38.85 (122
Very Easy  19.39 (57  9.24 (29)








Above Median  0.39
Below Median  0.28
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  0.80
Economic  Status'
Above Median  0.47
Below Median  0.19
Teat Difference Equal  Zero  2.04
Education 4
Above Median  0.43
Below Median  0.27
















Test Difference  Equal  Zero  -0.49
VIPs within community
Above Median  0.38
Below Median  0.30
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  0.57
VEPs outside community
Above Median  0.30
Below Median  0.35
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  -0.32
'Bootstrapped  standard errors
2 The median for age is 42 years
3The median for economic status is 0.36
The median for years of education  is  11Table  10
Trust in the Community
"Difference In Difference"  Cross-Tabulations
JSiF  Non-JSIF
Worse  18.09 (531  28.34 (89'
Same  35.15 (103)  33.79 (106'
Better  46.76 (137)1  37.90 (119)
Total  100.00 (293)1  100.00 (314)





t-statistic  l  2.78
Age2
Above  Median  0.17
Below Median  0.10
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  0.70
Economic Status 3
Above Median  0.17
Below Median  0.09
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  0.88
Education '
Above Median  0.07
Below Median  0.17
















Test Difference Equal  Zero  -0.71
VIPs within community
Above Median  0.21
Below Median  0.08
Test Difference Equal  Zero  1.40
ViPs outside community
Above Median  0.21
Below Median  0.10
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  1.17
'Bootstrapped  standard  errors
2 The median for age is 42 years
3The median for economic status is 0.36
'The  median  for years of education is 11Table 11
Easy to reach agreements
"Difference  In  Difference"  Cross-Tabulations
JSIF  Non-JSIF
Very Difficult  11.50 (33)  6.21 (19)
Difficult  15.33 (44)  30.07 (92)
Same  21.25 (61)  17.65 (54)
Easy  34.15 (98)  24.18 (74)
Very Easy  17.77 (51)  21.90 (67
Total  100.00 (287)  100.00 (306)







Above Median  0.15
Below Median  -0.01
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  1.06
Economic  Status 3
Above Median  0.13
Below Median  0.00
Test Difference Equal  Zero  0.88
Education '
Above Median  0.00
Below Median  0.10
















Test Difference  Equal  Zero  0.23
VIPs within  comnmunity
Above Median  0.21
Below Median  -0.05
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  m  1.76
VIPs outside  community
Above Median  0.21
Below Median  0.00
Test Difference Equal  Zero  1.23
1  Bootstrapped standard  errors
2 The median  for age is 42 years
3The median for economic status is 0.36
' The median for years of education  is  IITable 12
Community Leader Responsiveness
"Difference  In Difference"  Cross-Tabulations
JSIF  Non-JSIF
No  74.24 (219)|  75.00 (240
Yes  25.76 (76)1  25.00 (80)
Total  100.00 (295)1  100.00 (320,
Pearson Chi-Square: 0.0472




t-statistic  t  0.21
Age2
Above Median  -0.09
Below Median  0.09
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  -2.80
Economic  Status 3
Above Median  0.03
Below Median  -0.02
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  0.76
Education 4
Above Median  0.05
Below Median  -O  02
















Test Difference  Equal  Zero  1.85
VEPs  within  community
Above Median  0.05
Below Median  -0.03
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  1.32
VlPs outside community
Above Median  0.09
Below Median  -0.03
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  1.71
' Bootstrapped standard  errors
2 The median for age is 42 years
3The median for economic  status is 0.36
4The median for years of education  is IITable 13
Decisions by Community Leader
"Difference  In Difference" Cross-Tabulations
JSIF  Non-JSIF
Less Now  19.29 (27)  28.57 (64
Sarne Now  26.43 (37)  29.91 (67
More  Now  54.29 (76)  41.52 (93








Above Median  0.31
Below Median  0.08
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  1.74
Economic Status 3
Above Median  0.11
Below Median  0.25
Test Difference  Equal  Zeo  -1.05
Education 4
Above Median  0.01
Below Median  0.28
















Test Difference  Equal  Zero  -1.60
VIPs within conmunity
Above Median  0.19
Below Median  0.16
Test Difference Equal  Zeo  0.21
VEPs outside comnmunity
Above Median  0.18
Below Median  0.18
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  -0.03
' Bootstrapped  standard errors
2 The median for age is 42 years
3 The median for economic status is 0.36
4The median  for years of education is 11Table 14
Decisions by Community Meeting with Vote
"Difference  In Difference"  Cross-Tabulations
JSIF  Non-JSIF
Less Now  21.26 (27)  28.88 (54
Same Now  28.35 (36'  24.06 (45
More Now  50.39 (64'  47.06 (88'








Above Median  -0.14
Below Median  0.13
Test Difference Equal  Zero  -2.08
Economic  Status 3
Above Median  0.06
Below Median  -0.04
Test Difference Equal  Zero  0.75
Education 4
Above Median  0.02
Below Median  -0.01
















Test Difference Equal  Zero  1._i_  E
VlPs within  conumunity
Above Median  0.14
Below Median  -0.14
Test Difference  iEqual  Zero  2.22
ViPs outside conununity
Above Median  0.04
Below Median  -0.02
Test Difference  Equal  Zero  0.46
Bootstrapped standard effots
The rnedian fot age is 42 years
3The median for economic  status is 0.36
4Tbe median for years of education  is  11Policy Research  Working Paper  Series
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